在本文中,我们将全面从多个角度解析“英语告别演讲稿”,特别是在我们希望演讲能够取得良好效果的时候。准备一个演讲稿可以让演讲者更加自信和自豪,而演讲的效果不仅与演讲者的能力息息相关,还深受演讲稿的影响。那么该如何写好一篇演讲稿呢?希望您能从本文中获得一些宝贵的经验和教训。
道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟(douglas macarthur),美国陆军五星上将。出生在阿肯色州小石城的一个军人家庭。1899年中学毕业后考入西点军校,1903年以名列第一的优异成绩毕业,到工程兵部队任职,并赴菲律宾执勤。
麦克阿瑟有过50年的军事实践经验,被美国国民称之为“一代老兵”,而其自身的又曾是“美国最年轻的准将、西点军校最年轻的校长、美国陆军历史上最年轻的陆军参谋长”,凭借精妙的军事谋略和敢战敢胜的胆略,麦克阿瑟堪称美国战争史上的奇才。
提起这句话:“老兵永远不死,只会慢慢凋零”(old soldiers never die, they just fade away),就不由得想起那个叼着玉米棒子烟斗的麦克阿瑟,和他在1951年4月19日被解职后在国会大厦发表的题为《老兵不死》著名演讲。
我即将结束52年的军旅生涯。我在本世纪初之前参军,这是我童年希望和梦想的实现。自从我在西点军校的教练场上宣誓以来,这个世界已经过多次变化,而我的希望与梦想早已消逝,但我仍记着当时最流行的一首军歌词,极为自豪地宣示“老兵永远不死,只会慢慢凋零”。
i am closing my 52 years of military service. when i joined the army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. the world has turned over many times since i took the oath on the plain at west point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but i still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die; they just fade away.
"就像这首歌中的老兵,一位想尽一已之责的老兵,而上帝也赐予光辉使他能看清这一项责任,而我现在结束了军旅生涯,而逐渐凋谢。
and like the old soldier of that ballad, i now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as god gave him the light to see that duty.
演讲全文:麦克阿瑟在国会的告别演说
mr. president, mr. speaker, and distinguished members of the congress:
i stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride -- humility in the weight of those great american architects of our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this home of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race. i do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration.
they must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. i trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which i have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow american.
i address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country. the issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole.
while asia is ***monly referred to as the gateway to europe, it is no less true that europe is the gateway to asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other. there are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. i can think of no greater expression of defeati**.
if a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort. the ***munist threat is a global one. its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector.
you can not appease or otherwise surrender to ***muni** in asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in europe.
beyond pointing out these general trui**s, i shall confine my discussion to the general areas of asia. before one may objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must ***prehend something of asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her course up to the present. long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration in the philippines, the peoples of asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles of coloniali** and now see the dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity, and the self-respect of political freedom.
mustering half of the earth's population, and 60 percent of its natural resources these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments. whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of asian progress and it may not be stopped. it is a corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started.
in this situation, it be***es vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. what they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support -- not imperious direction -- the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation. their pre-war standard of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake.
world ideologies play little part in asian thinking and are little understood. what the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom. these political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unreali**.
of more direct and immediately bearing upon our national security are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the pacific ocean in the course of the past war. prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the united states lay on the literal line of the americas, with an exposed island salient extending out through hawaii, midway, and guam to the philippines. that salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack.
the pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. all this was changed by our pacific victory. our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire pacific ocean, which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it.
indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the americas and all free lands of the pacific ocean area. we control it to the shores of asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the aleutians to the mariannas held by us and our free allies. from this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every asiatic port from vladivostok to singapore -- with sea and air power every port, as i said, from vladivostok to singapore -- and prevent any hostile movement into the pacific.
any predatory attack from asia must be an amphibious effort.* no amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. with naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental asia toward us or our friends in the pacific would be doomed to failure.
under such conditions, the pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader. it assumes, instead, the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense.
it envisions no attack against anyone, nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained, would be an invincible defense against aggression. the holding of this literal defense line in the western pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof; for any major breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined attack every other major segment.
this is a military estimate as to which i have yet to find a military leader who will take exception. for that reason, i have strongly re***mended in the past, as a matter of military urgency, that under no circumstances must formosa fall under ***munist control. such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the philippines and the loss of japan and might well force our western frontier back to the coast of california, oregon and washington.
to understand the changes which now appear upon the chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. china, up to 50 years ago, was ***pletely non-homogenous, being ***partmented into groups divided against each other. the war-